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ABSTR ACT
Biobanks are repositories that collect, store and distribute large quanti-
ties of biological samples and associated data (collectively called biobank
‘material’). Although biobanks have different modes of operation, all face
a variety of similar challenges. Some of these challenges, such as donor
consent and privacy, have been rigorously debated, but comparatively less
attention has been paid to biobanks’ intellectual property (IP) practices. IP
rights (particularly patents) are integral to the translation of research into
clinically relevant outcomes and, therefore, are key features in the business
models of many biobanks. As a foundation for such research, commentators
have identified five IP clauses of interest: (i) non-obstruction clauses; (ii)
march-in clauses; (iii) grant-back clauses; (iv) return-of-results clauses and
(v) reach-through clauses (also commonly called ‘reach-through rights’).
In the limited literature that discusses the five clauses, commentators have
largely debated their advantages and disadvantages in the abstract. The IP
terms that biobanks actually use have not been empirically examined, apart
from some small case studies. In particular, no industry-wide evidence exists
on three points of biobanks’ IP practice: (i) if and how biobanks implement
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these five types of IP clauses, (ii) whether any norms or standards have
emerged, and (iii) whether the norms and standards align with commenta-
tors’ recommendations for using the five IP clauses. To address these three
gaps, the authors conducted a systematic, global survey of the IP clauses
used by large, human biobanks. The results indicate that biobanks draft
bespoke policies to meet their own needs, and probably do so without
knowledge of the gamut of IP terms available. This study also revealed
that, in general, biobanks are using IP terms differently from the advice of
the commentators. On reviewing the differences, we encourage the use of
march-in and grant-back clauses, discourage biobanks from using redundant
non-obstruction clauses, and call for more research on return-of-results
clauses. We also encourage the use of reach-through clauses to claim roy-
alties (not IP), but only in limited circumstances; for example, where user
access fees do not cover a biobanks’ operational costs.
K E Y W O R D S: biobanks, intellectual property, grant-back, licensing, march-
in, reach-through
I. INTRODUCTION
Biobanks are repositories that collect, store, and distribute large quantities of biological
samples and associated data (collectively called biobank ‘material’).1 By allowing third
parties to use their contents, biobanks play an important role in facilitating inno-
vation. They help scientists researching basic biological questions, as well as those
translating breakthroughs into new products.2 Often established with public seed
funding,3 biobanks have proliferated across the world with a wide variety of technical
arrangements, access policies, disease foci, and populations.4
Although biobanks have different modes of operation, all face a variety of simi-
lar challenges. Some of these challenges, such as donor consent5 and privacy,6 have
been rigorously debated, but comparatively less attention has been paid to biobanks’
intellectual property (IP) practices.7 IP rights (particularly patents) are integral to the
translation of research into clinically relevant outcomes and, therefore, are key features
1 Yvonne G. De Souza & John S. Greenspan, Biobanking Past, Present and Future: Responsibilities and Benefits,
27 AIDS 303 (2013).
2 Johnathon E. Liddicoat & Kathleen Liddell, Open Innovation with Large Bioresources: Goals, Challenges and
Proposals, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 6/2017, 1, 4 (2017); W
Nicholson Price II, Biobanks as Innovation Infrastructure for Translational Medicine, in Global Genes, Local
Concerns: Legal, Ethical and Scientific Challenges in Biobanking 42 (Timo Minssen, Janne R.
Hermann & Jens Schovso eds., 2019).
3 Don Chalmers et al., Has the Biobank Bubble Burst? Withstanding the Challenges for Sustainable Biobanking in
the Digital Era, 17 BMC Med Ethics 39, 1, 2 (2016).
4 Ma’n H. Zawati & Michael Lang, Biobank Donors and the Concept of Benefit: Time for Reciprocity, 4 Journal
of Law and the Biosciences 371, 372 (2017).
5 E. A. Whitley, N. Kanellopoulou & J. Kaye, Consent and Research Governance in Biobanks: Evidence from Focus
Groups with Medical Researchers, 15 PHG 232–242 (2012).
6 Mark A. Rothstein, Bartha Maria Knoppers & Heather L. Harrell, Comparative Approaches to Biobanks and
Privacy, 44 J Law Med Ethics 161–172 (2016).
7 Kathleen Liddell, Johnathon Liddicoat & Matthew Jordan, IP Policies for Large Bioresources: the Fiction,
Fantasy and Future of Openness, in Global Genes, Local Concerns: Legal, Ethical and Scientific
Challenges in Biobanking 257–260 (Timo Minssen, Janne R Hermann & Jens Schovso eds., 2019).
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in the business models of many biobanks.8 As one commentator put it, IP is the ‘last
piece of the biobank governance puzzle’ calling out for detailed research.9
As a foundation for such research, commentators have identified five IP clauses of
interest. These clauses have the potential to prevent socially undesirable innovation,
enrich biobanks’ collections, or improve biobanks’ financial positions. Each clause is
limited to downstream IP generated using biobank material. This study refers to these
clauses as: (i) non-obstruction clauses; (ii) march-in clauses; (iii) grant-back clauses;
(iv) return-of-results clauses; and (v) reach-through clauses (also commonly called
‘reach-through rights’).10 Briefly, non-obstruction clauses encourage biobank users
(hereafter, ‘users’) to follow certain principles when licensing their IP. March-in clauses
state that the user of a biobank must hand over user-owned IP to the biobank after a
triggering event. The triggering event could be other parties’ health-related research
being unreasonably restricted by the user, for example. Grant-back clauses oblige the
user to grant the biobank a license to their IP as a matter of course (without a triggering
event). Return-of-results clauses oblige users to give the biobank copies or samples of
their research results (generated from biobank material). Reach-through clauses give
the biobank certain rights over users’ innovations, for example, the clauses could give
the biobank joint-ownership of users’ IP.
Of the five clauses, commentators have mostly focused on reach-through clauses.
They attract special attention because, on their face, they could be lucrative and help
biobanks address one of their biggest challenges: financial sustainability.11 At least 10
biobanks have filed for bankruptcy or been acquired by other entities in recent years.12
Another reason reach-through clauses garner attention is that they are seen as being too
favorable to biobanks: biobanks provide biobank users with data and tissue, but not the
creativity that is typically essential for IP.
In the limited literature that discusses the five clauses, commentators have largely
debated their advantages and disadvantages in the abstract. The IP terms that biobanks
actually use have not been empirically examined, apart from some small case studies.13
In particular, no industry-wide evidence exists on three points of biobanks’ IP practice:
(i) if and how biobanks implement these five types of IP clauses, (ii) whether any
8 Hermann Garden, Naomi Hawkins & David Winickoff, Building and Sustaining Collaborative Platforms in
Genomics and Biobanks for Health Innovation, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No.
102, 5 (2021).
9 Yann Joly, Panel Discussion at Precision Medicine: Legal and Ethical Challenges (Apr. 8, 2016, University of
Hong Kong, Hong Kong).
10 Kathleen Liddell, Realising Genomic Medicine: Intellectual Property Issues, Centre for Law, Medicine and
Life Sciences & Centre for Science and Policy Workshop Report 1, 12 (2015).
11 A US survey found that 37 per cent of biobank personnel cited funding as their biobank’s greatest challenge:
R. Jean Cadigan et al., Neglected Ethical Issues in Biobank Management: Results from a U.S. Study, 9 Life Sci
Soc Policy 1, 5 (2013).
12 Jimmie Vaught et al., Biobankonomics: Developing a Sustainable Business Model Approach for the Formation of a
Human Tissue Biobank, 2011 J Natl Cancer Inst Monogr 24 (2011); Timothy Caulfield et al., A Review
of the Key Issues Associated with the Commercialization of Biobanks, 1 J Law Biosci 94, 106 (2014).
13 S. Fortin et al., ‘Access Arrangements’ for Biobanks: A Fine Line between Facilitating and Hindering Collaboration,
14 PHG 104–114 (2011); Aisling McMahon, Patents, Human Biobanks and Access to Health Benefits: Bridging
the Public–Private Divide, in Intellectual Property and Access to Im/material Goods 196–199
( Jessica Lai and Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016).
4 • An empirical study of large, human biobanks
norms or standards have emerged, and (iii) whether the norms and standards align with
commentators’ recommendations for using the five IP clauses.
To address these three gaps, the authors conducted a systematic, global survey of
the IP clauses used by large, human biobanks. This study analyses the use of all five IP
clauses of interest, paying particular attention to reach-through clauses. Commentators
have discouraged biobanks from using reach-through clauses,14 yet if biobanks exclude
such terms, the only other way for biobanks to generate income when users access
their materials is to charge access fees (unless the user pays the biobank to conduct
additional analyses).15 This means the use or avoidance of reach-through clauses can
affect biobanks’ financial sustainability. Consequently, this study contextualizes the
results on reach-through clauses by analyzing biobanks’ financial access conditions.
This paper is structured as follows. The first part provides an introduction and
context for the paper. The second part provides background information on each of the
five IP clauses, summarizing their operation and commentators’ opinions about their
desirability. The third part describes the survey method. The fourth part details the
results, and shows that none of the five clauses are used by more than 19 per cent of the
surveyed biobanks. Though norms of use have arisen for each clause, standards (in the
sense of similar drafting) have not.
The fifth part of the article discusses these findings. The results indicate that
biobanks draft bespoke policies to meet their own needs, and probably do so without
knowledge of the gamut of IP terms available. This study also revealed that, in general,
biobanks are using IP terms differently from the advice of the commentators. On
reviewing the differences, we encourage the use of march-in and grant-back clauses,
discourage biobanks from using redundant non-obstruction clauses, and call for more
research on return-of-results clauses. We also encourage the use of reach-through
clauses to claim royalties (not IP), but only in limited circumstances; for example,
where user access fees do not cover a biobanks’ operational costs.
II. BACKGROUND
This part provides background information on the five IP clauses, describing their oper-
ation and summarizing commentators’ opinions. Box 1, located at the end of this part,
provides a summary of the five IP clauses, and Table 11, located at the beginning of Part
IV, summarizes and compares commentators’ opinions with biobanks’ actual practice.
The limited literature in this area leaves room to contest or refine commentators’
opinions. However, this Background does not aim to provide a substantive critique of
these opinions. Instead, this study analyses these opinions in light of the study’s results
when discussing policy implications in Part IV.
II.A. Non-Obstruction Clauses
Non-obstruction clauses seek to influence the way users exploit their IP, and have
two characteristic features. First, non-obstruction clauses ‘encourage’ licensing that
14 Saminda Pathmasiri et al., Intellectual Property Rights in Publicly Funded Biobanks: Much Ado about Nothing?,
29 Nat Biotechnol 319 320–321 (2011); Jim Vaught & Nicole C. Lockhart, The Evolution of Biobanking
Best Practices, 413 Clinica Chimica Acta 1569, 1573 (2012); Marika Doucet et al., Biobank Sustainability:
Current Status and Future Prospects, 5 BSAM 1, 4 (2017); McMahon, supra note 13 at 186–187.
15 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 321.
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does not interfere with follow-on research, without expressly forbidding any specific
licensing practices. Second, since the terms only ‘encourage’ certain practices, if a user
ignores the encouragement, the biobank cannot seek a remedy against the user. As a
result, non-obstruction clauses can be aptly considered as guidance.
Pathmasiri et al. are the only commentators to recommend non-obstruction clauses
(under the name of ‘non-restrictive licensing’),16 however, they have not been the
subject of criticism. Pathmasiri et al.’s commentary draws heavily on two high-profile
policy documents: the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) ‘Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions’17 and the US National
Institute of Health’s (NIH) ‘Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions’.18
An overarching idea in these documents is that DNA-related patents should be licensed
in a way that fosters further innovation and dissemination of scientific knowledge, and
provides a reasonable financial return.
Pathmasiri et al. discuss several aspects of non-obstructive licensing practices, but
focus on one issue in particular: non-exclusive licensing.19 In short, they argue that
non-exclusive licensing practices protect the public from patent owners and exclusive
licensees cornering the market and imposing supra-normal prices.20 However, the
commentators acknowledge that exclusive licenses might be necessary for commercial
success in some circumstances.21 Consequently, Pathmasiri et al. recommend biobanks
‘strongly encourage’ users to adopt non-obstructive practices.
II.B. March-In Clauses
March-in clauses stipulate that certain user-owned IP must be given to the biobank after
a triggering event. What constitutes a triggering event is determined by the biobank,
and the triggers typically reflect types of user behavior the biobank wants to avoid.
March-in clauses rose in prominence after one was adopted by UK Biobank, a high-
profile longitudinal biobank in the UK.22 This term grants UK Biobank a royalty-free
license to a user’s IP if the user exercises their IP to ‘restrict health-related research
and/or access to health-care unreasonably’.23 UK Biobank included this term after
16 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 321–322.
17 OECD, Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions, http://www.oecd.org/sti/emerging-te
ch/36198812.pdf (accessed Oct. 20, 2020).
18 Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health Best Practices for the Licensing of
Genomic Inventions, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-11-19/pdf/04-25671.pdf (accessed
Oct. 20, 2020).
19 Id at 21.
20 Id.
21 Julien Pénin & Jean-Pierre Wack, Research Tool Patents and Free-Libre Biotechnology: A Suggested Unified
Framework, 37 Research Policy 1909, 1919 (2008); Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 322; Donna M.
Gitter, The Challenges of Achieving Open Source Sharing of Biobank Data, in Comparative Issues in the
Governance of Research Biobanks 165–189 (Giovanni Pascuzzi, Umberto Izzo & Matteo Macilotti
eds., 2013); Michiel Verlinden, Timo Minssen & Isabelle Huys, IPRs in Biobanking—Risks and Opportunities
for Translational Research, 2 I.P.Q. 106, 107 (2015).
22 David E. Winickoff, Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?, 35 J Law Med Ethics
440, 441 (2007).
23 UK Biobank, Access Procedures: Application and Review Procedures for Access to the UK Biobank Resource
(2011), https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Access_Procedures_Nov_2011.
pdf (accessed Oct. 20, 2020).
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consultation with the UK patent and biobank communities, as well as with the broader
public.24
March-in clauses have support in the biobank industry, as evidenced by UK
Biobank’s adoption of such a clause after consultation with industry and the public.
However, no settled academic consensus on their use has emerged. Commentary
about march-in clauses in biobank policies is limited. It points out that another high-
profile UK biobank, the 100,000 Genomes project, chose to omit a march-in clause,25
and that biobanks might have difficulty retrieving data which has been deidentified,
incorporated into other datasets, and spread across multiple research projects.26
There is considerably more commentary about march-in clauses in the pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology sectors. Commentators have tended to discuss this under
the name ‘march-in rights’.27 This name references a provision in US law that enables
a public sector funding agency (eg the National Institutes of Health) to insist, after
one of four triggering events, that the patentee funded by the government grant an
additional patent license to the government or another party.28 ‘March-in rights’ is an
established term, but this study adopts the terminology of ‘march-in clauses’ as a broader
category which captures a range of powers and consequences, which, for example,
include biobanks taking full ownership of users’ IP.
II.C. Grant-Back Clauses
Grant-back clauses oblige users to license their IP to the biobank.29 Pathmasiri et al.
describe grant-back clauses as automatically conveying biobanks a sub-licensable, non-
exclusive license to users’ IP, but only for non-commercial purposes.30 The aim of these
clauses is similar to non-obstruction clauses, in the sense that both are designed to avoid
the negative effects of users exploiting their IP unreasonably. However, the two operate
differently: non-obstruction clauses ‘encourage’ users to license IP in ways that do not
hinder follow-on research; while grant-back clauses safeguard follow-on research by
granting biobanks a license to the users’ IP.
Both Pathmasiri et al. and Verlinden et al. recommend biobanks use grant-back
clauses. Both also envisage grant-back clauses being sub-licensable, but Verlinden et al.
go further and describe the idea of limiting to whom the license can be extended. They
suggest that the licenses could limit authorization to use by academics, or internal use
24 Winickoff, supra note 22; UK Biobank, Public Consultation, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/public-consulta
tion/ (accessed Oct. 20, 2020).
25 Liddell, supra note 10 at 7–8.
26 Jane Kaye et al., Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century Research Networks, 23 Eur J
Hum Genet 141, 144 (2015).
27 See e.g. Carolyn L. Treasure, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Do March-In Rights Ensure Access to Medical
Products Arising From Federally Funded Research? A Qualitative Study, 93 The Milbank Q uarterly 761,
763 (2015). For a list of petitions to use march-in rights under the US law, see https://www.keionline.org/
cl/march-in-royalty-free (last accessed Dec. 4, 2020).
28 35 USC §203 (commonly referred to as the Bayh Dole Act).
29 A grant-back clause obligates the licensee to grant the rights on future advances or improvements in the
licensed technology to the licensor (Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry, 75(2) American
Economic Review 25–30 (1985).
30 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 322.
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by the biobank only.31 Verlinden et al. do not prefer any specific type of grant-back.
Rather, they describe these different types of licenses as possibilities.32
II.D. Return-of-Results Clauses
Return-of-results clauses oblige users to return research results (generated with
biobank material) to the biobank. These results can include biological samples, but gen-
erally commentators focus on users returning data. Verlinden et al. recommend grant-
back terms because new data from the user enriches the biobank collection.33 Path-
masiri et al. agree, adding that returned results maximize the utility of biobanks, reduce
reliance on finite physical samples, and promote the efficient use of research funds.34
Several commentators have raised concerns about return-of-results clauses inter-
fering with users’ ability to publish. Many researchers consider their data confidential
until they choose to publish it.35 The commentators argue that researchers might be
deterred from using a biobank that obliges users to return their results, because the
researchers might fear others will publish their results first.36 However, this issue can
be allayed by several means, including granting users an exclusivity period to publish
their work or requiring the return of results only after publication.37 With the proviso
of creating a period of exclusivity for researchers to publish their results, commentators
recommend biobanks adopt return-of-results clauses.38
II.E. Reach-Through Clauses
Reach-through clauses grant biobanks certain rights over users’ innovations, or as this
study defines them, they grant biobanks rights to users’ innovations where the biobank
has not made an inventive contribution. The scope of reach-through clauses varies and
can include full or partial ownership of users’ inventions and rights to royalties (or
revenues) from commercialized products.39
Several justifications for reach-through clauses exist. Pathmasiri et al. suggest that
biobanks might see reach-through clauses as an opportunity to generate income (eg
from licensing), and that biobanks might feel entitled to rights over users’ inventions
because the research would not have been possible without the biobank’s material.40
McMahon offers a further possible motivation for biobanks to seek reach-through
terms over downstream IP: by retaining a share in users’ IP, biobanks have more
31 Verlinden, Minssen & Huys, supra note 21 at 123.
32 Id.
33 Verlinden, Minssen & Huys, supra note 21 at 125.
34 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 322.
35 Liddicoat & Liddell, supra note 2 at 29.
36 Gitter, supra note 21 at 171; Roberto Caso & Rossana Ducato, Opening Research Biobanks: An Overview, in
Comparative Issues in the Governance of Research Biobanks 226 (Giovanni Pascuzzi, Umberto
Izzo, & Matteo Macilotti eds., 2013).
37 Gitter, supra note 21 at 170.
38 Caso and Ducato, supra note 36; Verlinden, Minssen & Huys, supra note 21 at 125.
39 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 Science 698, 699 (1998); Jane Nielsen, Reach-Through Rights in Biomedical Patent Licensing:
A Comparative Analysis of Their Anticompetitive Reach, 32 Federal Law Review 169, 171 (2004).
40 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 320.
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control over the products that reach the market, and this control could be justified as a
commitment to protecting the public interest.41
Despite these motivations for reach-through clauses, commentators generally advise
against them for two reasons. The first argument is that the terms are unjustifiable
because biobanks do not generally help users invent new products and processes.
Several commentators highlight that biobanks typically do not participate in users’
research projects. These commentators argue that it would therefore be unfair for
biobanks to reach-through to users’ IP when they do not meet the requirements of
inventorship under patent law.42
The second argument concerns increased transaction costs. Agreeing IP terms and
the apportionment of revenue-sharing are often the central objectives of licensing
deals. Due diligence exercises often focus on IP entitlements and royalty rights, raising
red flags when too many parties have legal interests that complicate negotiations and
dilute returns.43 Commentators argue that biobanks should avoid reach-through
clauses because they overly complicate licensing deals, and IP-savvy researchers
might then view biobanks that forego reach-through rights as more attractive.44
Beyond the biobanking literature, some commentators also warn against the use of
reach-through rights because these and other claims to royalties can lead to ‘royalty
stacking’. Researchers are likely to avoid biobanks and partnerships which involve
multiple downstream royalty payments.45 Consequently, biobanks that insist on
reach-through clauses risk being under-utilized.
Reach-through clauses have been the topic of various critiques in biobanking liter-
ature and biomedical law more widely, and the different fields have raised a variety of
different issues. One difference is that the biomedical law literature has discussed reach-
through terms to royalties decoupled from IP46 (ie a reach-through term to royalties
without a concomitant claim to IP rights). This study did not identify any reach-
through clauses to IP, but did identify clauses reaching-through to other subject matter,
particularly royalties. Part IV of this paper addresses the difference between these types
of reach-through clauses and their implications for biobanks’ IP practices.
Reach-through clauses are similar to grant-back clauses, in the sense that biobanks
obtain rights over users’ inventions. However, whereas grant-back terms provide
biobanks with non-commercial, non-exclusive licenses, reach-through terms convey
ownership or royalties.47 Reach-through clauses can also be considered similar to
march-in clauses in that the latter can convey ownership, but march-in clauses are only
triggered by predetermined behaviors, whereas reach-through rights occur as a matter
of course.
41 McMahon, supra note 13 at 187.
42 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 320; Vaught and Lockhart, supra note 14 at 1573; Verlinden, Minssen, &
Huys, supra note 21 at 127.
43 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 321; John Liddicoat, Jeffrey M. Skopek & Kathleen Liddell, Precision
Medicine: Legal and Ethical Challenges, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 64/2017,
1, 6 (2017).
44 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14 at 321.
45 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 39 at 698–700; see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001).
46 Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 39 at 698–701; Nielsen, supra note 39 at 169–204.
47 Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 39; Nielsen, supra note 39.
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Box 1. Core characteristics of the five IP clauses
Non-obstruction clauses encourage users to license their IP on non-exclusive and
reasonable terms. The clauses do not forbid any specific licensing practices, nor do
they stipulate remedies for ignoring the encouragement.
March-in clauses are characterized by having a triggering condition/s. When a user
engages in behavior which constitutes a triggering event, the user must give the
biobank rights over their IP, for example, ownership or rights under license.
Grant-back clauses stipulate that biobanks are granted, as a matter of course, a non-
exclusive license to users’ IP for research purposes. These licenses may be sub-
licensable to all biobank users, or limited to specific groups. There is no triggering
event.
Return-of-results clauses oblige users to return the results of their research to the
biobank for incorporation into the collection. The clauses typically focus on data,
but results may also include biological samples.
Reach-through clauses grant biobanks certain rights over users’ IP, which the
biobank has not invented. Biobank commentators describe the clauses reaching
through to IP, but the clauses can also reach through to other subject matter (such
as royalties).
III. SURVEY METHOD, IP DOCUMENTS & BIOBANK DEMOGRAPHICS
This study’s primary aim was to identify and compare the IP terms and financial
access conditions used by biobanks. Accordingly, it focusses on large, human biobanks
because they are the most likely to be involved in translational research and, therefore,
have policies on IP.
III.A. Biobank Identification & Survey Distribution
An initial ‘long list’ of candidate biobanks was prepared, drawing on information from
online searches, specialized websites, and publications.48 This long list was reviewed to
exclude organizations that: (i) were still being established; (ii) were no longer opera-
tional; (iii) were generally inaccessible to the public (such as private collections held
by commercial diagnostic companies); and (iv) promoted best practices for biobanks
but did not hold any samples or data. Once these organizations were excluded, 504
biobanks remained.
This study determined which of the 504 biobanks were ‘large’ via two proxies.
The first proxy was size, measured either in terms of the number of samples held
or the number of participants. Any biobanks with over 1,000,000 samples or 30,000
participants were considered large. The second proxy was whether the biobank was
publicized as a ‘national’ resource. This second proxy supplements size by including
biobanks that are likely to be the largest or most developed in countries with smaller
48 E. Zika et al., A European Survey on Biobanks: Trends and Issues, 14 Public Health Genomics 96–
103 (2011); Holger Langhof et al., Access Policies in Biobank Research: What Criteria Do They Include and
How Publicly Available Are They? A Cross-Sectional Study, 25 Eur J Hum Genet 293–300 (2017); Erika
Kleiderman et al., The Author Who Wasn’t There? Fairness and Attribution in Publications Following Access to
Population Biobanks, 13 PLoS ONE e0194997 (2018).
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populations. The number of biobanks that qualified as ‘large’ or a ‘national’ resource
was 150.
All 150 biobanks were contacted by email between July 2018 and April 2019. The
email explained the project and asked for copies of relevant documents, including: (i)
access policies for researchers; (ii) conditions of access; (iii) material transfer agree-
ments (or similar); (iv) policies for entering into agreements with commercial partners;
and (v) policies on inventions and the ownership of IP created in collaborations. Fifty-
four biobanks responded to the emails with relevant documents, a response rate of 36
per cent.
Biobanks were not offered an inducement to respond to the email. Anonymity was
offered to the biobanks to encourage document sharing. One biobank requested that
its documents were not reproduced verbatim, and two biobanks requested that their
participation remain anonymous. Anonymity of these two biobanks has been protected
by refraining from naming these biobanks and by omitting information that could
be used to deduce or infer their identity. In some instances, this paper has replaced
information on these biobanks with ‘anonymous’.
III.B. IP Documents & Biobank Demographics
The 54 respondent biobanks provided 184 documents. Ninety-seven documents
included details of IP terms or financial access conditions, leaving 87 that did not. The
97 documents represented 18 broad document types (eg agreements and forms), which
fell into one of two categories: (i) sixty-one contained binding terms (eg contracts); and
(ii) thirty-six did not contain binding terms (eg policies). Table A in the Supplementary
Material breaks down these documents by title and whether they contain binding
terms.
The 61 documents with binding terms came from 44 biobanks, meaning 10
biobanks did not provide a document with binding terms. However, these biobanks
did provide documents that detailed their approaches to IP and access conditions. As
a result, all 54 biobanks provided information on the topics under study.
Whether the biobanks’ documents were available gratis (publicly available and free-
of-charge) online affects whether other biobanks can access them. This accessibility,
in turn, affects whether norms and standards can arise. Thirty-eight biobanks (70%)
supplied documents that were available online, while 16 (30%) did not.
Fifty-one of the 54 biobanks were located in 23 countries. The other three biobanks
were based in multiple countries or were international in character (Table 1). The three
countries with the most biobanks were the UK, Australia and the USA, which together
constituted 39 per cent of the sample. Fourteen countries had one biobank, including
countries such as Latvia, Malta, Norway, and Taiwan (Table 1). Overall, the results give
a global perspective, albeit one orientated towards English-speaking nations.
Table 1 shows that four of the five most common respondent jurisdictions were
English-speaking, common law nations: the UK, Australia, USA, and Canada. Due
to shared legal and cultural histories, it is possible that biobanks from these nations
employed similar drafting techniques and stances on IP. This study investigated this
possibility by analyzing whether any of the terms under study arose more frequently
in these four common law nations compared with the rest of the world (Table E,
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Table 1. Locations of the respondent biobanks




Canada and Sweden 4 (7%)
International/multi-country 3 (6%)
Denmark; India; Israel; and Spain 2 (4%)
Argentina; Austria; Anonymous;
China/UK; Cyprus; Finland; France;
Japan; Latvia; Malta; The
Netherlands; Norway; and Taiwan;
and Zambia
1 (2%)
Table 2. Research foci of the respondent biobanks
Research focus # Biobanks (% of total)
Numerous disease foci/general purpose 24 (44%)
Cancer (in general) 16 (30%)
Neurobiological diseases 3 (6%)
Cancer and rare diseases 2 (4%)
Chronic diseases 2 (4%)
Infectious diseases 2 (4%)
Cancer, heart disease and osteoporotic fractures in
post-menopausal women
1 (2%)
Diabetes, digestive health, and kidney diseases 1 (2%)
Health and nutrition 1 (2%)
Impacts of exposure to terrestrial trunked radio on health 1 (2%)
Phenylketonuria 1 (2%)
Supplementary Material). The numbers are all quite small (10 or less), and no patterns
that significantly diverge from the results below were observed.
The biobanks had 11 different research foci. Two foci were particularly common:
24 biobanks (44%) were designed for general use or had numerous research foci, and
another 16 (30%) focused on cancer (in general). The remaining biobanks focused on
nine areas (Table 2).
Seven different organizational structures managed the biobanks (Table 3). The
most common types of managing organizations were universities or research institutes
(17, 31%), followed by not-for-profit organizations (12, 22%). Only one biobank (2%)
was managed by a for-profit company.
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Table 3. Managing organizations of the respondent biobanks
Biobanks’ managing organizations # Biobanks (% of total)
University/Research Institute (includes university
hospitals and university networks with central access
points)
17 (31%)
Not-for-profit organizations (includes domestic and
international consortia with central access points and





University/Research Institute + Hospital 5 (9%)
State/Government + Hospital + University/Research
Institute 2 (4%)
State/Government + Hospital 1 (2%)
For-profit company 1 (2%)
III.C. Non-Responder Bias
This study examined non-responder bias by comparing the demographics of biobanks
that did respond to this survey (54) with the biobanks that did not (96). Non-
responder bias was examined for: (i) the locations of the biobanks; (ii) the research
foci; and (iii) biobanks’ managing organizations. The full breakdowns are recorded
in Tables B–D in the Supplementary Material. The numbers are too small to permit
in-depth statistical analysis, but the following three findings stand out.
First, the survey received fewer responses than might be expected from biobanks
located in the USA. Biobanks from the USA constituted 31 (21%) of the 150 biobanks
that were invited to participate in this survey, yet only five biobanks responded, which
comprises 9 per cent of the respondent cohort. It is unclear how this result affects this
study; especially as common law jurisdictions are well-represented in the respondent
cohort. Second, the proportion of UK biobanks that responded to the survey was
higher than expected. UK Biobanks constituted 11 per cent (17/150) of the biobanks
emailed to participate in this study yet made up 17 per cent of the respondent biobanks.
This higher-than-expected response is likely due to the location of the study authors.
Third, 30 per cent (16/54) of respondent biobanks focused on cancer research yet only
constituted 21 per cent of the 150 invited to participate in the study. Cancer research
often aims at translating findings into clinical practice, and, since IP is often necessary
for translation, the high response from cancer biobanks might reflect their interest
in IP. There were no significant differences between respondent and non-respondent
biobanks with regard to managing organizations.
III.D. Coding and a Typology of Biobanks’ Financial Access Conditions
The documents supplied were coded using the software package Nvivo 12. The doc-
uments were coded for: (i) the presence and content of the five IP terms; and (ii)
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financial access conditions. In addition, the documents were coded for (iii) definitions
of IP; and (iv) ownership of background IP. The definitions of IP affect how the
five IP terms operate, and the ownership of background IP allowed an evaluation
of whether biobanks made claims to users’ IP generated before the users accessed
biobanks’ materials.
A three-model typology was devised to describe biobanks’ financial access condi-
tions. Table 10 (in Part III) describes these models and records each biobank’s financial
access conditions.
III.E. Limitations
This study has two limitations. The first is that the study sample cannot claim to be
comprehensive or represent every possible approach towards IP and financial access
conditions. However, with a 36 per cent response rate from large biobanks and at least
one document from each addressing IP practices and access conditions, this study does
provide a useful picture of contemporary IP practices in biobanking.
The second limitation is that one biobank (2%) provided documents in a language
the investigators could not read, so they were analyzed using Google Translate. The
accuracy of this software is questionable, but the translations were intelligible.
IV. RESULTS
This part first describes how biobanks define IP and allocate the ownership of back-
ground IP, then examines how biobanks use the five IP clauses. This part also identifies
some differences between actual practice and commentators’ views of the five IP
clauses.
IV.A. Definitions of IP and Ownership of Background IP
Forty-four biobanks (81%) did not define the term ‘intellectual property’. The 10
biobanks (19%) that did define IP used 11 definitions, with one biobank supplying
two definitions (extractions of the definitions are recorded in the Supplementary
Material, Table F). All the definitions included copyright, design rights, know-how, and
patents or inventions, but were worded differently. For example, the definitions listed 67
different subject matters in total (eg brand names, ideas, and circuit layouts), of which
44 were unique to one definition (see Supplementary Material, Table G).
Although all the definitions of IP were different, 10 of the 11 definitions included a
phrase that acted as a substantive catch-all. Two examples of these phrases are ‘including
but not limited to’ and ‘all other forms of intellectual property rights having similar or
equivalent effect’. These phrases extend the definitions of IP to cover subject matter
that was not explicitly mentioned. These phrases show an intention by the biobanks
to capture all substantive forms of IP. Consequently, although all the definitions of IP
were different, they could have similar interpretations. On the other hand, all remain
somewhat vague as there is no settled, uniform definition of ‘intellectual property law’
or ‘intellectual property rights’.
Forty-seven biobanks (87%) addressed the ownership of background IP. Roughly
stated, ‘Background IP’ is the IP that a biobank and user respectively owned before the
user accessed the biobank. No biobank included a term that transferred ownership of
background IP from the biobank to the user (or vice versa). The various clauses the
biobanks used to described background IP are summarized in Supplementary Material,
Table H.
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IV.B. Non-Obstruction Clauses
Four biobanks (7%) included a non-obstruction clause to patents or inventions, leaving
50 biobanks (93%) that did not. The relatively low uptake of non-obstructive licensing
terms differs from the view of commentators, who tended to advocate their use. Table 4
summarizes the content of the four terms. All four had different wording, though
two mentioned compliance with the NIH’s policy document. Supplementary Material,
Table I reproduces the full wording of each of the four clauses.
Table 4. Summaries of non-obstruction clauses




Users agree to implement licensing policies that
do not obstruct future research. 1 (2%)
Users agree to implement licensing policies that
do not obstruct future research, following the
OECD’s Guidelines.
1 (2%) 4 (7%)
Users agree to implement licensing policies
consistent with the NIH’s Best Practices for
the Licensing of Genomic Inventions.
2 (4%)
IV.C. March-In Clauses
Five biobanks (9%) included a march-in clause whilst the remaining 49 (91%) did not,
showing that these clauses are uncommon in practice. There is no consensus on the use
of march-in clauses in biobanking literature. This means it is not possible to evaluate
whether theory accords with practice.
Table 5 summarizes the content of the five march-in clauses, explaining the four
distinct sets of triggers and consequences. The triggers can be classified into two
groups: (i) breaches of research standards (ie ‘prohibited use’ or when the access
agreement is violated), and (ii) harms to innovation (ie IP licensed ‘unreasonably’
or users not actively developing inventions). Only the clauses concerning harms to
innovation directly concerned IP-related issues. Consequently, the number of biobanks
that used a march-in clause for IP-related reasons is only two (4%).
Two of the 49 biobanks that did not include a march-in clause used a ‘pseudo’ march-
in term (not described in Table 5). These terms specified that users were only permitted
IP over inventions created in the course of authorized uses of biobank material. The
terms did not specify what action would be taken if users obtained IP in the course of
‘unauthorized’ uses.
This study did not classify these terms as march-in clauses because their purpose
was to prevent users from obtaining IP rights, rather than reallocating IP. These terms
were not classified as non-obstruction clauses either, because the terms prevented users
from obtaining IP, rather than suggesting ways IP should be exercised.
IV.D. Grant-Back Clauses
Nine biobanks (17%) included a grant-back clause to data, patents or inventions,
leaving 45 (83%) that did not (Table 6). All grant-back clauses generated licenses which
were royalty-free, non-exclusive, and limited to non-commercial purposes.
An empirical study of large, human biobanks • 15
Table 5. Summary of biobanks’ march-in clauses
Trigger Consequence # Biobanks
Users put the borrowed material
to a ‘prohibited use’ (eg the
biobank material is used in a
research project other than
the one authorized by the
biobank).
Ownership of all information,
research results, inventions
and the like arising from the
prohibited use is transferred
to the biobank.
2
Users violate the terms of their
agreement with the biobank
The biobank may request
immediate termination of the
user’s study, may deny future
access to data, and may
recapture any data in the
possession of the user.
1
Users put their IP to an
‘unreasonable use’ (eg the
recipient licenses their
innovation in an unreasonably
restrictive way)
A sub-licensable license is
granted to the biobank so that
other researchers who are
granted access to the biobank
can exercise rights to the
extent necessary to conduct
their research project.
1
Users do not maintain or develop
inventions
The biobank is entitled to have
the patents or patent
applications assigned to them
at no cost.
1
Table 6. Summary of biobanks’ stances on grant-bank clauses
Stances on grant-back clauses # Biobanks (% of total)
Omitted 45 (83%)
Included 9 (17%)
Pathmasiri et al. supported grant-back clauses on the basis that the clauses were sub-
licensable (ie the license could be extended to other users), but only two biobanks (4%)
used a term that operated this way. The other seven biobanks (13%) drafted terms that
limited the license to internal biobank purposes, which meant these biobanks could
not license other users. Verlinden et al. support the idea of non-sublicensable grant-
back clauses on the basis the biobanks could use the technology. Putting to one side the
nuance in operation, both Pathmasiri et al. and Verlinden et al recommend the use of
grant-back clauses, yet the results show relatively few biobanks are embracing them.49
49 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14; Verlinden, Minssen & Huys, supra note 21.
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IV.E. Return-of-Results Clauses
Nine biobanks (17%) included a return-of-results clause, leaving 45 (83%) that did
not (Table 7). The characteristics of return-of-results differed on two points: (i) when
the results should be returned, and (ii) the purposes to which the results could be put
(Table 8). No biobank obliged users to return the results before they had published
them as a matter of course. The most common time to return results was on request, but
such requests can only be made when the biobank is aware the results exist, indicating
that return is most likely after publication. The second most common time to return
results was on completion of the research project, which would typically be signaled
by the publication of results. Therefore, commentators’ concerns that return-of-results
clauses would interfere with users’ abilities to publish are unlikely to be relevant in
practice.
The majority of return-of results-clauses identified in this study (56%) limited
biobanks to using returned results for internal purposes only. Commentators recom-
mend return-of-results clauses on the basis that other users could use the returned
results.50 This means that only four biobanks (44%) used return-of-results terms that
were consistent with the commentators’ recommendations.
This study also identified a type of pseudo-return-of-results clause not recorded in
Tables 7 or 8. The biobank that used this term was government-owned, and the term
authorized the government healthcare provider to use the results to treat patients. The
term provided the government healthcare provider with ‘fair and reasonable’ access
to any results the user produced from biobank materials. This study did not count
this term as a full return-of results clause because the ‘fair and reasonable access’
can be in the form of preferential financial terms. This clause was not classified as a
grant-back clause either, because the rights do not arise as a matter of course, they have
to be negotiated.
Table 7. Summary of biobanks’ stances on return of results terms
Stances on return-of-results terms # Biobanks (% of total)
Included 9 (17%)
Omitted 45 (83%)
Table 8. Characteristics of return-of-result terms
When should the results be returned? # Biobanks (% of total)
On request 5 (55%)
On completion of the research project 3 (33%)
Prior to first sale of a commercial product 1 (11%)
Internal biobank use only 5 (56%)
For merging with the biobank’s contents
(internal research purposes and
sharing)
4 (44%)
50 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14; Verlinden, Minssen & Huys, supra note 21.
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IV.F. Reach-Through Clauses
This section first discusses clauses that reach-through to IP before addressing three
other types of reach-through terms.
1. Reach-Through Clauses to IP
No biobank used a reach-through clause to IP (Table 9). As mentioned above, biobank
literature has focused on reach-through clauses to IP, with biobank commentators
discouraging biobanks from using them. Accordingly, biobank practice aligns with the
commentators’ opinions on this topic.
Although no biobank used a reach-through clause to IP, 11 biobanks adopted
approaches to the ownership of foreground IP in which ownership was not prede-
termined. These 11 approaches fell into one of three categories: (i) on a case-by-
case basis; (ii) relative contributions; and (iii) a relatively complicated set of pre-
defined scenarios. These clauses raised the possibility that biobanks obtained IP they
did not create. However, these clauses were generally orientated towards joint research
or covered situations when a biobank provided material approximating an inventive
Table 9. Summary of biobanks’ reach-through terms




No reach-through term included 44 (81%) 44 (81%)
Reach-through to tangible property
Biobank materials and ‘any substances that incorporate
any part of the biobank materials’ will remain the
property of the biobank.
1 (2%)
Biobank material and any ‘modifications’ shall remain
the sole property of the biobank.
1 (2%) 3 (6%)
The biobank is the sole owner of the biological samples
and all their derivatives.
1 (2%)
Reach-through to royalties
Royalty-sharing determined on a case-by-case basis 3 (6%)
The biobank (together with other collaborating parties)
is entitled to 75% of net revenues; the user retains
25%
1 (2%) 4 (8%)
Reach-through to royalties for the benefit of donors
Commercial royalties are payable to the donor who
provided the relevant material
2 (4%) 2 (4%)
Other
Biobank operator is entitled to ‘favorable’ conditions on
users’ products and services
1 (2%) 1 (2%)
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contribution. Consequently, these clauses were not classified as reach-through terms
to IP. Supplementary Material, Table J summarizes these clauses and the remaining
stances biobanks took on the ownership of foreground IP.
2. Reach-Through Clauses to Tangible Property, Royalties & ‘Favorable’ Conditions
The three other types of reach-through clauses identified in this study have not been
analyzed by commentators. This section, therefore, offers some reasons why biobanks
may have chosen to implement them.
The first type is reach-through clauses to ‘tangible’ property. This study found three
biobanks (6%) used these terms, but none of the biobanks explained why. One of four
possible explanations is that the biobanks want to protect donor privacy, and biobanks
do this by asserting property over things that incorporate users’ samples. A second
reason is that the biobanks might want to improve their resources by obtaining new
derivatives of their materials, and the biobank might see this as a fair exchange for the
material provided in the first instance. A third reason is that biological samples are a
finite resource and that the biobanks want a property right to prevent material going
to waste. These second and third reasons are plausible, but they require the biobanks
to monitor users’ research and organize return of the samples. These are time intensive
processes, thus, less compelling explanations than the first.
A fourth explanation is based on the possibility that a user’s commercial product
incorporates biobank material. If this occurs, then a reach-through clause to tangible
property would mean the biobank would have the power to deal with the commercial
product and could potentially stop the user’s commercial activities or ask for a royalty
on product sales. However, this reason is unlikely, due to the difference between
ownership of IP and ownership of tangible property. Although the biobank might be
able to request the material is returned, the user would likely own the IP in the material
and, therefore, could avoid the royalty by creating the material from another source.
Consequently, biobanks that did include a reach-through term to tangible property
probably did so for the first suggested explanation, namely the protection of donors’
privacy.
The second type of reach-through clause found in this study was to royalties decou-
pled from IP rights. This study found that four biobanks (8%) used one of these clauses
for the benefit of the biobank (or its partners), and two biobanks (4%) used one for the
benefit of biobank donors. None of these six biobanks was a for-profit company.
The operation of the reach-through clauses to royalties varied significantly. The
most common approach to determining royalties was assessment on a case-by-case
basis, but the three biobanks that adopted this approach differed on when the deter-
mination occurred. One biobank, which was managed by a university, determined
the royalty when the invention was made (regardless of whether the invention was
patented) and stated that the university would obtain a ‘reasonable share’ of the revenue.
The second, which was also managed by a university, determined the royalty when
the user accessed the biobank, and the third, which was managed by a government,
determined the royalty before the first sale of the user’s product. No other information
on determining the royalties was provided.
The biobank that stated users retain 25 per cent of their net revenue was managed
by a government and university. The remaining 75 per cent was distributed in equal
portions to the government health service, the biobank, and the managing university.
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This was the only biobank that specified a royalty rate in the clause, but no information
was provided explaining how the biobank arrived at this rate beyond the implicit
distribution of net royalties between the four parties (ie user, biobank, university, and
government health service).
Two biobanks used reach-through clauses to royalties for the benefit of ‘donors’. The
first of these biobanks was managed by a government, and the term was required by law.
The biobank’s access policy required that users outline the details of a revenue-sharing
scheme in their research proposal. The second biobank that included a reach-through
royalty for donors was managed by a not-for-profit company that was closely aligned
with government objectives. The reach-through term required that individual donors
receive commercial royalties but provided little other information.
This study classified the final reach-through clause used by a biobank as ‘other’. This
biobank was managed by a state health department, and the term entitled the national
health provider to ‘favorable’ conditions on users’ services and products (based on
the biobank material). This approach was deemed to fall under the umbrella of reach-
through clauses because it conveys a financial benefit to the biobank and would apply
to market products the biobank did not invent. The biobank’s terms stated that the
‘favorable’ conditions would reflect the contributions the health service made in the
development of the product, but no other details were provided.
One conspicuous lack of detail concerned how ‘favorable’ should be interpreted.
One interpretation of the word ‘favorable’ is that the user would have to sell their
product to the health provider at a lower price than normal, otherwise the clause would
fail to convey an advantage. This study classified this term as a reach-through because
this interpretation is plausible and would therefore likely entitle the government to a
discount on users’ products.
Overall, this study found that 10 biobanks (19%) used a reach-through clause of
some description. However, this study does not emphasize this finding because the
four types of clauses this study did find (tangible property, royalties for biobanks,
royalties for donors, and ‘favorable’ terms) operate differently. These differences mean
that grouping these clauses together would likely lead to misunderstandings, especially
because analyses of reach-through clauses in biobank literature predominantly have
addressed reach-through to patent rights.
IV.G. Financial Conditions for Access
A three-model typology was devised to describe biobanks’ financial access conditions.
Table 10 describes the three models and records each biobank’s conditions against
these models. With all models, users may also have to pay administrative and ancillary
costs, covering expenses like sample preparation, postage, and application processing.
Table 10 shows that 52 of the 54 biobanks were roughly split between those that
charge access fees (28 biobanks, 52%) and those that do not (24, 44%). The remaining
two biobanks had ‘miscellaneous’ conditions. The most common fee-paying model was
‘variable’ (17, 31%), which describes a fee structure that varies according to certain
criteria, rather than being fixed. There were differences between each of the variable
models adopted by biobanks, but some of the criteria included: whether the user was
profit-making, whether the user was part of the biobank’s network or consortium, and
the type of data and samples requested. Another typical way to vary the access fee was
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Table 10. Biobanks’ financial access conditions
Financial access
model
Description of model # Biobanks, % of total
(# Biobanks also used a
reach-through to royalties)
Model 1—no fee Biobanks either described free
access or the documents did




Biobanks charge a one-off, flat fee





Biobanks charge a one-off, flat fee
of a specified amount. 4, 7% (0)
Model 3—variable
access fee
Biobanks charge an upfront,
variable fee for access. 18, 33% (2)
Miscellaneous Financial access conditions not
fitting into the above models. 2, 4% (0)
to provide users with lists of different types of materials at different prices. Eight of the
17 biobanks (47%) provided a price list. These ‘price lists’ allowed users to decide on
the type and amount of materials they wanted and could afford.
Table 10 also shows how biobanks financial access conditions overlap with reach-
through clauses to royalties that benefit biobanks (hence the two reach-through clauses
to royalties that benefit ‘donors’ are excluded). Table 10 shows that an equal number
of reach-through terms to royalties were associated with fee-based access models (2)
as no-fee access models (2). These numbers are small, but indicate that biobanks that
charge fees are similarly inclined to draft reach-through terms to royalties as those that
do not charge access fees. Furthermore, Table 10 shows that if the reach-through terms
to royalties are considered a type of fee for access, then 22 biobanks (41%) did not
charge any type of fee.
Two ‘miscellaneous’ stances did not fit neatly into the models in the typology. One
biobank’s access terms included the possibility of models 1, 2, and 3. Thus, this model
could be more accurately described as multi-model. The second biobank supplied
documents with conflicting statements on fees. One document stated that it did not
charge a fee, and another stated that it charged a flat fee. Consequently, this model could
not be accurately categorized.
V. SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This part of the paper is divided into two sections. The first section considers the
norms and standards in the results and what these mean for the drafting of IP policies.
The second section analyses the divergences and alignments between commentators’
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opinions and the norms identified in this study. For each of the five IP clauses, this study
offers advice on whether biobanks should reconsider their use.
V.A. Drafting IP Policies: Norms and Standards
Table 11 summarizes the commentators’ opinions and the results of this study. The
term ‘norm’ is used to describe the most common approaches employed by biobanks,
and ‘standard’ is used to describe specific wording used by biobanks.
Table 11 shows that an overall biobank norm was to omit all five IP clauses. This
finding aligns with commentators’ recommendations on reach-through clauses to IP,
indicating that biobanks and commentators have shared views. However, this finding
diverges from commentators’ recommendations for non-obstruction clauses, grant-
back clauses and return-of-results clauses. Further, no standard language was found
when biobanks did use one of the five terms. These findings have two implications for
the drafting of IP policies.
The first implication is based on the absence of standards. This indicates that when
biobanks draft IP terms, they are not copying terms used by other biobanks or templates
produced by NGOs.51 The second implication concerns whether biobanks are aware
of the gamut of IP terms available when drafting their documents. On the one hand,
biobanks could be aware of the full range of IP terms, informed by external advice
or in-house knowledge and research, especially since the majority of biobank access
arrangements in this survey were accessible gratis online (38/54, 69%), as were several
NGO’s templates.
On the other hand, a variety of factors weigh in favor of biobanks being ‘unaware’
of the gamut of IP clauses. First, even if biobanks obtain other biobanks’ access agree-
ments, relatively few access documents incorporate an IP term, limiting any IP knowl-
edge biobanks can gain. Second, biobanks must grapple with a myriad of other issues,
which probably limit their abilities to explore IP options. For instance, biobanks have
to deal with an overwhelming number of governance issues, such as donor privacy
and confidentiality, donor consent, complicated access requests, updates to technology,
external research projects, external funding, technical aspects of collection and storage
of samples, hiring sufficient expertise, and returning results to donors.52 Moreover,
managing organizations such as universities and hospitals often employ staff that ded-
icate only part of their time to the biobanks. The rest of their time is dedicated to
other tasks such as teaching, research, and clinical practice. Consequently, attention to
IP terms is likely forgone in favor of simpler, functional arrangements. Indeed, whilst
conducting this study, eight biobanks have requested a copy of the results and two
biobanks have informally asked the authors for results because they are largely unaware
of what terms most biobanks use.
51 See for example the P3G Generic Access Agreement: Bartha Maria Knoppers et al., A P3G Generic Access
Agreement for Population Genomic Studies, 31 Nat Biotechnol 384–385 (2013).
52 Stefan Eriksson & Gert Helgesson, Potential Harms, Anonymization, and the Right to Withdraw Consent to
Biobank Research, 13 European Journal of Human Genetics 1071–1076 (2005); Caulfield et al., supra
note 12 at 94–110; Dianne Nicol et al., Precision Medicine: Drowning in a Regulatory Soup?, 3 J Law Biosci
281–303 (2016); Catherine Heeney & Shona M. Kerr, Balancing the Local and the Universal in Maintaining
Ethical Access to a Genomics Biobank, 18 (80) BMC Medical Ethics 1–11 (2017).
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Table 11. Summary of commentators’ opinions and survey results
Topic Summary of opinion(s) Survey results
Non-obstruction
clauses
Pathmasiri et al. recommend
biobanks should use
non-obstruction clauses to
encourage users to license
non-exclusively.




No standards were evident.
March-in clauses No opinion in biobank
literature.
Norm to omit march-in terms:
5/54 biobanks used a
march-in clause (9%) and






biobanks draft terms that
require users to license their
IP back to biobanks for
non-commercial purposes.
These clauses might also be
limited to certain users or
internal biobank.
Norm to omit grant-back terms:
9/54 biobanks used a





biobanks draft terms that
require users to return their
results to the biobank so
other users may obtain them.
Norm to omit return-of-results
clauses: 9/54 biobanks used a
return-of-results clause






reach-through terms to IP.
Biobank commentators have
not analyzed reach-through
terms to tangible property or
royalties ‘decoupled’ from IP.
No biobank used a reach-through
term to IP, but three (6%)
used a reach-through to
tangible property, six (11%)
used a reach-through to
royalties ‘decoupled’ from IP,
and one used a reach-through
to secure access to
innovations on ‘favorable’
terms (2%). Overall, norm to
omit reach-through terms,
10/54 (19%) included one.
No standards were evident.
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On balance, the argument that biobanks are operating with imperfect knowledge
when drafting their IP policies is the more convincing. The sheer number and complex-
ity of competing governance considerations limits the amount of time and resources
biobanks can allocate to developing their IP practices. Where dedicated legal expertise
is unavailable, biobanks are likely to be unaware of the gamut of IP terms available to
them. Similarly, the need to prioritise other aspects of governance means biobanks have
limited capacity to refine the terms they do draft.
Bearing these implications in mind, the discussion in the next two sections draws on
wider legal commentary and IP practice to refine and encourage the use of some terms
and discourage the use of others.
V.B. Theory vs. Practice
This section reviews the areas of divergence and one area of alignment between
the IP clauses that biobanks use and commentators’ opinions. The discussion of
terms proceeds thematically, first addressing march-in clauses, then non-obstruction
clauses, grant-back clauses, return-of-results clauses, and lastly reach-through clauses
and financial access conditions.
1. March-In Clauses: A Fire Extinguisher?
March-in clauses are neither recommended nor advised against in the biobanking
literature, and this survey found that five biobanks (9%) use one, each with one of four
triggering behaviors. The results show that these triggers fall into two categories: (i)
breaches of research standards and (ii) harms to innovation. Only two biobanks (4%)
used a march-in clause that concerned IP-related issues.
Two reasons potentially explain why relatively few biobanks use march-in clauses.
The first is that biobanks are not aware of them. This reason is quite compelling
for march-in clauses because biobank commentators have barely mentioned them.
Another reason is that breaches of research standards and harms to innovation occur
infrequently. However, excluding clauses because issues arise infrequently is not a
compelling justification. Even if a triggering event occurs only once every 10 years,
biobanks would likely want to avoid it. This is especially true for breaches of research
standards. For example, if a donor’s privacy is breached, then trust in the general idea of
biobanks is harmed, and people will be discouraged from donating in the future. The
biobank managers involved in this breach would prefer to avoid the negative publicity
and the possibility of an investigation into its operations. The offending user would also
rub salt into the wound if they retained IP connected to the breach.53
The effects of breaching research standards are slightly different from harms to inno-
vation. Breaches of research standards are often decided by disciplinary bodies, leaving
no questions about whether a breach occurred. In comparison, harms to innovation
are typically not decided by a body of experts, and the terms are quite vague as to
what behavior triggers them. For example, one of the terms in this study empowered
the biobank to obtain users’ IP if a user fails to develop an invention. However, the
user might have good reasons for not developing an invention; for example, funding,
53 Aisling M. McMahon, Biotechnology, Health and Patents as Private Governance Tools: the Good, the Bad and
the Potential for Ugly?, 3 I.P.Q. 161, 172 (2020).
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technical difficulty, or the user might have a vision for the technology that depends
on the development of another technology first. Consequently, parties might have
different views on when a harm to innovation has occurred.
A report following an expert workshop discussed march-in clauses that are designed
to prevent users licensing their IP on unreasonably restrictive terms. Focusing on
the march-in clause used by UK Biobank, the report notes that experts present at
the workshop queried whether such clauses were ‘genuinely enforceable’, but did not
resolve the issue.54 The passage under discussion stated that the biobank obtains a
license ‘[if the user’s IP] is used to restrict health-related research or access to healthcare
unreasonably’.55 When there are competing views about whether health research has
been restricted (or access to healthcare unreasonably restricted), it could be difficult
to decide if the march-in condition has been triggered. In contract law, a contract
may be unenforceable for ‘uncertainty’ if the term has ‘no clear objective meaning’.56
This—or practical difficulties of enforcement—may explain why participants at the
Expert Workshop questioned whether the UK Biobank’s march-in clause was genuinely
enforceable. That said, courts rarely void terms for uncertainty,57 and several strategies
exist to redress contractual uncertainty and give the parties more clarity on what the
terms mean.
The first strategy is that a biobank could provide examples of what types of behavior
it wants to avoid. For example, a biobank may wish to avoid issues that have attracted
significant criticism in the past, such as licensing of diagnostic tests that exclude second
opinions,58 prices for drugs in countries in which most people cannot afford them,59
and preventing universities from conducting non-commercial research.60 ‘History does
not repeat itself, but it rhymes’,61 and examples would provide more clarity on what
types of behavior should be avoided.
Second, contractual terms can be given more certain meaning with a third-party
arbiter.62 For example, in a contract between two oil companies, the parties agreed
that disputes would be decided by an international arbitrator, whose powers included
deciding which country’s system of law they would apply in their decision.63 The
contract was alleged to be unenforceable because it failed to specify the governing law,
54 Liddell, supra note 10 at 4.
55 Id.
56 Sir Kim Lewison, Chapter 8: Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Interpretation of Contracts 6th Edition
(K. Leweson ed., 2015).
57 Openwork Ltd. v Forte [2018] EWCA Civ 783.
58 Department for Health and Human Services USA, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on
Patient Access to Genetic Tests: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society.
Available at https://osp.od.nih.gov/sacghsdocs/gene-patents-and-licensing-practices-and-their-impact-
on-patient-access-to-genetic-tests-report-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-genetics-health-a
nd-society/ (accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
59 Regina Deverio, Activist for AIDS sufferers. Available at https://www.princeton.edu/&#x007E;paw/archive_
new/PAW01-02/11-0313/classnotes.html#ClassNotes3 (accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
60 Tania Bubela, Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Robert Cook-Deegan, The Mouse That Trolled: the Long and Tortuous
History of a Gene Mutation Patent That Became an Expensive Impediment to Alzheimer’s Research, 2 J Law
Biosci 213, 238–252 (2015).
61 An expression of unknown origin but often attributed to Mark Twain.
62 Lewison, supra note 56.
63 Deutsche Schachtbau-Und Tiefbhorgesellschaft m.b.H. v R’as al-Khaimah National Oil Co. [1987] 3 WLR 1023
at 1023.
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but Donaldson MR found the terms were sufficiently certain for the simple reason
that the parties specifically left the decision-making power to the arbitrator.64 In the
context of biobanking and deciding whether a march-in clause has been triggered,
suitable arbitrators might include: members from IP licensing societies, university
ethics bodies, and biobank ethics bodies.
Biobanks have good reasons to avoid breaches of research standards and harms to
innovation, and march-in clauses could provide suitable mechanisms to address these
concerns. The possibility of having a third party decide when harms to innovation
arise not only solves the issue of contractual uncertainty and arguments about what
constitutes harm, but also means the issue can be dealt with swiftly compared with
seeking a court decision. In this way, march-in clauses can be considered akin to a
fire extinguisher: generally lying dormant but able to counteract undesirable situations
when needed. This study, therefore, encourages biobanks to consider (or reconsider)
march-in clauses for breaches of research standards and harms to innovation and
society.
2. Non-Obstruction Clauses: A Paper Tiger?
This study found only four biobanks (7%) used non-obstruction clauses, which con-
trasts with Pathmasiri et al.’s recommendation to use them. Several reasons potentially
explain why these clauses have been infrequently adopted. First, the non-binding nature
of the clauses (these clauses only ‘encourage’ users to adopt certain licensing behaviors)
means they cannot be enforced. Accordingly, non-obstruction clauses may have been
perceived as ‘toothless’ and serving no legal purpose. In contrast, the small number of
biobanks that did adopt these clauses may have done so because they ‘signal’ to users
the type of behavior the biobanks desire.
Second, Supplementary Material Table I shows that biobanks that implement non-
obstruction clauses often adopt phrases similar to ‘the [user] agrees not to obstruct
future research’. However, what is ‘obstructive’ is open to different interpretations. The
mere fact a license fee is charged will likely obstruct some research, and users could
justify relatively high fees on the basis of financial investment, risk, the quality of the
product, or the company’s ongoing commercial viability. Few licensors are likely to
think their license terms are unreasonable. Consequently, biobanks have good reasons
to think that non-obstruction clauses will not alter any users’ behavior.
A third issue is the overlap between march-in clauses preventing harms to innovation
and non-obstruction clauses. Both are broadly aimed at preventing the same issue,
meaning that march-in clauses, perhaps with slight drafting modifications, could fulfil
the role of non-exclusive licensing terms, and probably perform better because they
can be enforced. Indeed, even if biobanks have no intention of enforcing march-in
clauses, they are still preferable. Users may not be aware that march-in clauses are not
enforced, or that compliance is not monitored. In any event, a user might comply simply
because they are written in obligatory terms. Consequently, this study recommends that
biobanks omit non-obstruction clauses because they are toothless, too open-textured,
and redundant in light of march-in clauses.
64 Id. at 1035.
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3. Grant-Back Clauses: A ‘Quid Pro Quo’?
This study found nine biobanks used grant-back clauses (17%), a finding at odds
with commentators’ recommendations that biobanks should embrace the clauses. This
study also found that two of these clauses were sub-licensable, in the sense that the
license could be extended to other biobank users. The other seven clauses were not sub-
licensable, only allowing biobanks to use the IP internally. The different scopes of these
licenses have implications for how biobanks and users are likely to see the terms.
Grant-back clauses that are not sub-licensable allow a biobank to handle users’ IP
for the biobank’s own internal purposes. For instance, the IP might cover methods
of analyzing data or biological samples. The biobank could license this IP from the
user in a separate agreement. However, the biobank might consider a grant-back clause
for internal use a reasonable ‘quid pro quo’ for providing the material. Although
commercial users may argue that these types of licenses undermine the value of their
IP because they lose a license fee, this is a relatively unconvincing argument, as the
biobank would constitute only one licensee in a national or global licensing strategy.
Thus, biobanks have justifiable grounds to use grant-back clauses for internal uses.
The situation, however, is different for sub-licensable grant-back clauses. Pathmasiri
et al. advocated the use of such clauses to guard against users licensing on unreason-
able terms, thereby harming follow-on innovation. Sub-licensable grant-backs act as a
remedy to this situation, by allowing biobanks to extend the license to other users. Yet,
one problem with sub-licensable grant-back clauses is that sub-licenses could authorize
hundreds or thousands of users. Mass licensing would raise the risk of grant-back
licenses undermining the value of the IP. For example, if a user developed a new way of
analyzing samples and the biobank automatically licensed all other users, then the user
could be deprived of a substantial proportion of its potential licensees. This example
also raises the question of whether the uses would be commercial (in which the user
should pay a license fee) or whether the uses would be non-commercial (in which a
user would not have to pay). However, it is not always clear whether uses of inventions
are commercial or non-commercial, and policing this line would likely be expensive
and time consuming. Consequently, users have good grounds to avoid sub-licensable
grant-back clauses, and biobanks therefore have a good reason to omit them.
If biobanks did not have a mechanism to ensure that users license their IP on
reasonable terms, then perhaps this conclusion on sub-licensable grant-back licenses
would be different. However, this study found that march-in clauses can be drafted to
provide appropriate responses to unreasonable licensing practices, which effectively
leaves sub-licensable grant-back clauses redundant.
4. Return-of-Results Clauses: Pyrite or Gold?
Commentators recommended biobanks use return-of-results clauses on the grounds
that the results would be shared with other users. Yet, this study found only nine
biobanks (17%) included a return-of-results clause and that only four of these biobanks
included a clause that allowed the results to be shared with other users. The discussion
below explores why biobanks may have omitted return-of-result clauses and concludes
that it is prudent to collect more evidence on the benefits of these clauses before
encouraging or discouraging biobanks from using them.
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Biobanks take great care in developing and curating their data and might consider
any returned data to be unworthy of reintegration for several reasons. One reason is
that biobanks might be concerned about the quality and reproducibility of the data, a
situation commonly known as the ‘reproducibility crisis’.65 Another reason concerns
interoperability and file formats. Scientists frequently transfer data to each other in
different formats and, hence, biobanks might be concerned about interoperability
issues. It takes time and effort to reformat the data to make it compatible and to avoid
errors the reformatting may introduce.66 A third reason is that, even if the data is in the
correct format, biobank staff might find the data incomprehensible or have to spend too
much time trying to interpret it. Moreover, these issues are multiplied by the number
of biobank users, possibly making the management of the returned data overwhelming.
The arguments opposing the use of return-of-project-results terms are compelling,
but so is the prospect of the clauses enriching biobanks’ collections. Consequently, fur-
ther empirical research on this topic is required, with particular emphasis on identifying
if biobanks view the adoption of such clauses as beneficial. This research should also
distinguish between situations where biobanks use users’ results for internal purposes
and situations where the biobank shares the results with other biobank users. Until this
research has been conducted, it remains difficult to comment definitively on whether
biobanks should embrace or avoid return-of-results clauses.
5. Reach-Through Clauses: A Lottery?
No biobank in this study used a reach-through clause to claim IP rights. Therefore,
biobank practice on these terms aligns with the opinions of commentators, who dis-
couraged the use of reach-through clauses because biobanks typically do not contribute
to inventions and claims to IP can increase transaction costs. However, this study also
found four other types of reach-through clauses: (i) tangible property; (ii) royalties for
donors; (iii) ‘favorable’ terms; and (iv) royalties for biobanks. Each of these clauses will
be discussed in turn.
Previous studies on IP clauses focused on how the clauses could prevent undesirable
innovation, enrich biobanks’ collections, or improve biobanks’ financial positions.67
This study was designed to focus on the same issues, especially financial sustainability.
However, the first three types of reach-through clauses found in this study do not
address these issues: reach-through to tangible property likely protect donor privacy;
royalties for donors are connected to benefit sharing and donor recruitment;68 and
‘favorable’ terms typically benefit the higher-level government or healthcare institu-
tions (by allowing them to buy less expensive products), not the biobank. Since these
three clauses raise issues beyond the scope of this study, this paper reports these findings
but leaves them for other studies to analyze.
65 Paul Glasziou et al., Reducing Waste from Incomplete or Unusable Reports of Biomedical Research, 383 Lancet
267–276 (2014); John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Clinical Research Is Not Useful, 13 PLoS Med (2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4915619/ (accessed Oct. 21, 2020).
66 Moritz Lehne et al., Why Digital Medicine Depends on Interoperability, 2 NPJ Digit Med (2019), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6702215/ (accessed Oct. 21, 2020).
67 Pathmasiri et al., supra note 14.
68 Dianne Nicol & Christine Critchley, Benefit Sharing and Biobanking in Australia, 21 Public Underst Sci
534–555 (2012).
28 • An empirical study of large, human biobanks
6. Reach-Through Royalties & Financial Access Conditions: Securing Sustainability?
Reach-through clauses to royalties (for the benefit of biobanks) can generate
extra income, and were used by four biobanks (7%). Reach-through clauses to
royalties secure a return for the biobank while navigating commentators’ concerns
about biobanks obtaining rights over downstream IP without making an inventive
contribution. However, the apportionment of royalties dilutes returns for users, who
receive less income from sales or licensing. The issue of diluted returns is a key part of
weighing whether biobanks should embrace reach-through clauses to royalties. Before
that issue is addressed, though, it is instructive to review this study’s findings on financial
access conditions and other studies’ conclusions on the financial sustainability of
biobanks. These findings indicate that some biobanks likely need to use reach-through
clauses to royalties to remain financially viable. Consequently, this study supports
reach-through claims to royalties when biobanks need them to stay solvent but also
suggests these terms should be constrained by several other competing interests.
If biobanks omit reach-through terms to royalties and IP, then the only option for
them to generate income when users access their materials is to charge a fee (assuming
users do not pay for additional analyses). This study found that 22 biobanks (41%)
do not charge access fees or include a reach-through clause to royalties. This finding
means nearly half of the biobanks in this study fund their activities from other sources.
These 22 biobanks are in a good position to maximize the utility of their materials as
public infrastructure, as no researchers will be deterred from seeking access because of
up-front costs or diluted returns.
The financial position of biobanks that need to charge access fees is different. Albert
et al. studied the financial positions of three cancer biobanks in Canada.69 Their study
assessed what different types of users are prepared to pay to obtain biobank materials as
well as the costs to collect and maintain the materials. Albert et al. found that academic
researchers were able to pay only 10–25% of the costs to collect and maintain the
samples,70 yet they also found that industry researchers were able to pay the full cost of
samples and could even afford an additional margin to offset the costs that academics
could not cover.71
This study found that 32 biobanks (59%), including the one biobank which offered
conflicting statements, charged an access fee or included a reach-through term to
royalties for the biobanks’ benefit. This study also found that 18 of these biobanks
adopted a variable charging model, but only one altered their fees if a user was from
industry. The biobanks in this study are likely to have a variety of funding sources (eg
government, external grants, cross-subsidies from other operations), and they are also
likely to have a firm idea about their revenue and expenditure. Nonetheless, Albert et al.
showed that the costs of maintaining samples increase over time rather than decrease
as many might expect. They also argue that biobanks have inflated expectations of their
ability to recover costs,72 and their results suggest biobanks should look to variable
69 Monique Albert et al., Biobank Bootstrapping: Is Biobank Sustainability Possible Through Cost Recovery?, 12
Biopreservation and Biobanking 374–380 (2014).
70 Id. at 377.
71 Id. at 379.
72 Id.
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charging models with higher rates for industry users if they are facing or expect financial
challenges.73
Variable charging models with higher fees for users from the commercial sector may
be appropriate for biobanks that need extra income, yet many biobanks will not know
ex ante what level of fees will deter industry users. Biobanks are also usually keen to
attract as many users as possible because it is the primary reason the biobanks are built.
This puts some biobanks between a rock and a hard place: raise fees for industry users
too high and risk losing the industry users, or lower the fees and risk insolvency. This is
where reach-through rights to royalties can fit in. If biobanks think that they have raised
fees as high as possible without deterring users, then royalties might be their only other
option to generate additional income.
This justification for reach-through terms to royalties is relatively cogent because
insolvent biobanks cannot serve their purpose of enabling scientific research. However,
this discussion is incomplete until the issue of whether diluted commercial returns will
deter users is addressed.
7. Do Reach-Through Clauses to Royalties Deter Users?
No evidence exists on whether reach-through clauses to royalties deter users. Neverthe-
less, it is still useful to consider this issue from first principles with some insights from
related research. To begin with, the issue can be split into two questions (i) whether a
reach-through royalty will deter users regardless of the rate and (ii) whether only certain
‘higher’ royalty rates will deter users.
Future studies should try to answer these questions. In the meantime, two studies
that consulted the public on this topic offer some insight on the first question. These
studies found support for royalties, especially when the biobank made a material
contribution to the user’s product.74 Consequently, if the extra funds from the royalties
help biobanks remain solvent and the public thinks that it can be appropriate for
biobanks to have a share of the royalties, users will have difficulty arguing that royalty
clauses are unjustified in principle. Instead, a more important issue is to identify the
rates at which users are likely to be deterred.
One biobank in this study had a fixed rate of 75 per cent of revenue returned to the
biobank (and its associated partners). This biobank might serve as a good case study to
examine the deterrence effects of royalty rates. The other three biobanks determined
their royalties on case-by-case bases. This approach has the bonus of fitting the royalty
to the contribution the biobank makes, with one biobank going one step further by
stating that it was entitled to a ‘reasonable share’.
The word ‘reasonable’ connotes ideas of ‘sound judgement’, ‘fairness’, and ‘modera-
tion’.75 Users would likely find it difficult to argue that biobanks are not entitled to a ‘fair’
73 Recent ideas on ‘infrastructure theory’ also support this approach. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic
Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 917–1030 (2004); W Nicholson Price
II, supra note 2.
74 Dianne Nicol et al., Understanding Public Reactions to Commercialization of Biobanks and Use of Biobank
Resources, 162 Social Science & Medicine 79, 85 (2016); UK Biobank, Access to the UK Biobank
Resource: Advising on the Public Interest and Public Good, https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports.
html (accessed Oct. 20, 2020).
75 Oxford English Dictionary.
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or ‘moderate’ share if the biobank made a material contribution to the product, even if
this contribution falls below the threshold of inventiveness for a patent. However, users
might still have concerns about how the biobank’s share will be calculated. In particular,
users will generally be the party risking resources on the commercial product, and
hence it is possible that they might be concerned if the royalty calculations exclude or
downplay this risk and other commercial realities.
Perhaps the best way for biobanks to alleviate users’ concerns about how a royalty
will be calculated is to specify that, in the absence of agreement between the parties,
the rate will be determined by a third party with suitable qualifications. The World
Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) offers arbitration and ‘expert determination’
services,76 as do several other groups.77 WIPO even supplies clauses to be inserted
into contracts mentioning these dispute resolution mechanisms.78 Thus, mechanisms
exist for biobanks to implement reach-through terms to licenses that will likely alleviate
users concerns about royalty calculations.
8. Roles for Reach-Through Clauses to Royalties
The discussion in this section has so far concentrated on whether reach-through clauses
to royalties can be justified and, if so, how royalty rates can be set and calculated so
as not to deter users. However, two further issues arise with royalties and biobank
finances. The first issue is that royalty income is unpredictable, as no one knows when
a user will produce a commercial product. This unpredictability is compounded by the
relatively low success rates of biomedical commercialization.79 The second issue is that
the amounts that biobanks stand to receive are variable, depending on the royalty rate
and the commercial success of the product.
These two issues do not mean the clauses will fail to benefit biobanks, but they do
suggest biobanks should think of royalties in different ways to access fees (and other
funding). Biobanks could see royalties as an opportunity to fill unforeseen financial
gaps that will almost inevitably open up (eg the increasing cost of maintaining samples,
as foreseen by Albert et al.).80 Another way is to see them as opportunities to fund
improvements over time to the biobank or, if the royalties are large enough, to relieve
governments (or other funders) of funding commitments in future years.
In short, reach-through terms can be viewed as an unusual lottery: it is unwise for
any organization to base its finances on winning a lottery, but if lottery tickets are free
(or low cost) and the proceeds can alleviate fiscal difficulties, then organizations that
have access to these unusual lotteries should consider taking out tickets.
76 World Intellectual Property Organization, Alternative Dispute Resolution, https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
(accessed Oct. 21, 2020).
77 See for example the UK IPO’s mediation service: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/intellectual-property-me
diation#the-ipos-mediation-service (accessed Oct. 20, 2020).
78 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Clause Generator, https://www.wipo.int/amc-apps/clau
se-generator/ (accessed Oct. 21, 2020).
79 J. A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated With New Drug Development: Success Rates for Investigational
Drugs, 87 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 272, 274–276 (2010); Michael Hay et al., Clinical
Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 32 Nat Biotechnol 40–50 (2014).
80 Albert et al., supra note 69 at 375.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This survey sought to provide an empirical review of the IP practices and financial
access conditions employed by large, human biobanks. Earlier studies identified five
IP clauses that had the potential to prevent socially undesirable innovation, enrich
biobanks’ collections, and improve biobanks’ financial positions: (i) non-obstruction
clauses; (ii) march-in clauses; (iii) grant-back clauses; (iv) return-of-results clauses; and
(v) reach-through clauses. This study analyzed whether and how biobanks used these
clauses, and paid particular attention to reach-through clauses because they have the
potential to help biobanks’ financial sustainability.
This study found a low uptake of all five IP clauses and, where the clauses were
used, no standards have emerged in the form of similar wording. The low uptake of
reach-through clauses is consistent with commentators’ opinions. On the other hand,
the low uptake of the four remaining IP terms differs from commentators’ recommen-
dations. Two overlapping reasons potentially explain this divergence: (i) biobanks are
not aware of the gamut of IP terms available; and (ii) IP is not a critical concern in
practice, and biobanks instead focus on more pressing aspects of biobank governance.
Regardless of the reason, this study suggests that biobanks should take renewed interest
in their IP policies, as several of the underused clauses could offer significant benefits.
This study reviewed the competing arguments for the five clauses. In conclusion,
it encourages the use of march-in clauses, finding that, with some tweaks, the clauses
could be useful tools for rectifying breaches of research standards and preventing
unreasonable licensing practices. Contrastingly, this study discourages non-obstruction
clauses because they are toothless, too open to different interpretations, and redundant
(in light of march-in clauses). This study also discourages the use of grant-back clauses
that are sub-licensable to other IP users because the clauses could undermine the value
of users’ IP, and thus deter users. On the other hand, this study encourages a subtler use
of grant-back clauses that licenses biobanks to handle users’ IP for internal purposes.
These clauses can be justified as a ‘quid pro quo’ for the material and data supplied by
the biobanks.
The arguments for and against return-of-results clauses are relatively balanced,
and it is unclear whether they are beneficial in practice. Therefore, this study neither
encourages nor discourages their adoption. Instead, this study calls for further empirical
research.
All biobank commentators that discussed reach-through clauses focused on the idea
of biobanks claiming users’ IP rights. This study found no examples of biobanks that
used a reach-through clause to IP. However, this study did find several other reach-
through clauses to different subject matter, of which the most common was royalties.
This study recommends that biobanks use reach-through terms to royalties, but only
in limited circumstances.
This study recommends that access fees with higher charges for commercial indus-
try should the primary way biobanks remain solvent. However, if access fees prove
insufficient, then reach-through terms to royalties might provide vital additional funds.
In these circumstances, biobanks should consider: (i) limiting the royalties to circum-
stances when the biobank made a ‘material contribution’ to the product; (ii) ensuring
royalties rates are ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair’; and (iii) using a third party with experience in
commercial negotiations to settle royalties when they cannot be settled between the
parties.
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